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‘Off With Their Heads’: British Prime Ministers and
the Power to Dismiss
ANTHONY KING AND NICHOLAS ALLEN*
The British prime minister’s power to appoint and dismiss ministers is probably his most important
single power. This article explores how prime ministers from Macmillan to Blair have used that
power. The article considers the criteria that prime ministers use when choosing to appoint or dismiss
individuals from ofﬁce before examining the calculations and miscalculations that prime ministers
have made in practice. Finally, the article analyses the way that prime ministers have exercised, in
particular, their power to dismiss and ﬁnds that Thatcher was far more likely than others to sack
cabinet colleagues on ideological or policy grounds. The article emphasizes that prime ministers’
relationships with especially powerful ministers – ‘big beasts of the jungle’ – are crucial to an
understanding of British government at the top.
There is universal agreement that the British prime minister’s power to appoint and
dismiss his or her fellow ministers is among his or her most important powers, probably
his most important power. In appointing ministers, he or she shapes his government. In
dismissing them, he does likewise. Merely possessing the power to dismiss individual
ministers gives the prime minister far greater leverage over them than he or she would
otherwise have. As Peter Hennessy puts it in The Prime Minister:
Here lies the true locus of prime ministerial primacy in terms of the primus over the pares. And
the instrument of the power is, in Enoch Powell’s vivid phrase, the equivalent of Henry VIII’s
axe y In terms of ﬁring ministers, it really can be a matter of off-with-their-heads, though
political reality does limit the scope of wholesale butchery, at least.1
Richard Crossman, while still a long-serving member of Harold Wilson’s cabinet,
addressed an audience at Harvard in similar terms:
First of all, remember that each Minister ﬁghting in the Cabinet for his Department can be sacked
by the Prime Minister any dayy I am aware that I am there at the Prime Minister’s discretion.
The PrimeMinister can withdraw that discretion on any day he likes without stating a reason. And
there’s nothing much I can do about it – except succeed, and so build up my own strength.2
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1 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Ofﬁce and Its Holders since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, The
Penguin Press, 2000), pp. 68–9.
2 Richard Crossman, Inside View: Three Lectures on Prime Ministerial Government (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1972), p. 63. One of Margaret Thatcher’s former cabinet colleagues made the same point using
To imagine a prime minister deprived of his or her power of appointment and dismissal is
to imagine the holder of a much diminished ofﬁce.
In Britain, the power of the head of government to appoint and dismiss his or her fellow
ministers is largely unfettered. The only severe constraint upon him or her – but it is severe –
is that the great majority of his appointments must be made from among the elected
members of the House of Commons.3 In the United States, France, Sweden, Norway, the
Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal, for example, serving government ministers may not
simultaneously be members of the national legislature; if they are members of the national
legislature at the time of their appointment, they must immediately vacate their seats.4
In other countries – Germany, Austria, Italy, Finland, Denmark and Japan, for example –
members of the cabinet may be members of parliament but need not be.5 In all of those
countries, unlike in the United Kingdom, those making ministerial appointments have a
degree of ﬂexibility in reaching out beyond the ranks of legislators and even, in some cases,
beyond the ranks of politicians and party members.
At the same time, however, British prime ministers are not constrained in ways that
many other heads of government are. British prime ministers can appoint and dismiss
more or less whomever they like. The decisions are theirs, and they can make them on
more or less whatever basis they like. That is not so in many countries, especially those
countries – a large proportion of the world’s democracies – in which coalition govern-
ments rather than majority governments are the norm. In those countries, even if the head
of government has the formal power to appoint and dismiss ministers, he or she is likely
(F’note continued)
similar language: ‘We were all, at different times, antagonized by the way Margaret ran roughshod over
Cabinet, but outsiders do not appreciate fully the patronage power of a Prime Minister who won a
General Election in 1983 and then again in 1987. The only way you get into Cabinet is if the Prime
Minister decrees it. The only way you can move up from being Minister of Agriculture to Foreign
Secretary is if the Prime Minister ordains it. The politician who keeps in favour is not being unprincipled.
He or she has to recognize that the Prime Minister will decide.’ See Peter Walker, Staying Power: An
Autobiography (London: Bloomsbury, 1991), p. 232.
3 The House of Commons Disqualiﬁcations Act 1975 limits to 95 the number of members of the
House of Commons who may be appointed to ministerial ofﬁce. The Ministerial and Other Salaries Act
1975 limits to 110 the total number of individuals who may be paid ministerial salaries. In other words, a
British prime minister may appoint no more than ﬁfteen ministers in the House of Lords unless either he is
prepared to restrict the number of ministers in the House of Commons and/or one or more ambitious
(and probably wealthy) individuals, whether MPs or members of the House of Lords, are prepared to
work for nothing. At the time of the 1997 British general election, the standing orders of the Parlia-
mentary Labour Party sought to restrict the freedom of choice of any incoming Labour prime minister by
requiring him to appoint to his new cabinet all those who had been members of Labour’s shadow cabinet
when the party was in opposition and who were still MPs. However, the new prime minister, Tony Blair,
ignored this rule to the extent of appointing two elected members of the former shadow cabinet to his
government, but only as junior ministers outside the cabinet.
4 See Torbjo¨rn Bergman, Wolfgang C. Mu¨ller, Kaare Strøm and Magnus Blomgren, ‘Democratic
Delegation and Accountability: Cross-national Patterns’, in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Mu¨ller and
Torbjo¨rn Bergman, eds, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), Table 4.9, pp. 150–1.
5 On the ﬁve European countries mentioned in the text, see Bergman et al., ‘Democratic Delegation
and Accountability: Cross-national Patterns’, Table 4.9, pp. 150–1. On Japan, see Tomohito Shinoda,
Leading Japan: The Role of the Prime Minister (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000), pp. 59–61. Although the
heads of government in all of these countries are constitutionally permitted to appoint cabinet ministers
who are not members of the legislature, it is unusual in some cases for them to do so. In Japan, for
example, the great majority of cabinet ministers are also legislators.
250 ‘OFF WITH THEIR HEADS’
to be largely or wholly constrained by the need to negotiate individual appointments and
portfolios with the leaders of the other parties in the coalition – and quite possibly with other
leading ﬁgures in his or her own party. In Italy, the prime minister has usually ‘played a very
limited part in the choice of ministers, as their selection [has been] left to each party of the
coalition within the quota of ministerial positions assigned to that party’.6 Similarly, in
Austria, ‘the Chancellor’s power of nomination is restricted, as one of the principles of the
Austrian coalition government is that each party has full autonomy in the selection of
its cabinet members’.7 The same has historically been the case in such countries as the
Netherlands, Denmark and Finland and even in France and Germany when the incumbent
administration in one or other of those two countries has depended for its parliamentary
majority on more than one party. Until recently, the Australian Labor party (ALP) and
the New Zealand Labour party excluded the prime minister entirely from the selection
process: the two parties’ parliamentary caucuses elected all the members of the ALP and
New Zealand Labour party cabinets. In 2007, however, Australia’s newly elected Labor
prime minister, Kevin Rudd, broke with tradition and chose his own cabinet.8
Moreover, whereas British prime ministers, like American presidents, take for granted their
power to dismiss ministers from their cabinet, heads of government in many other countries
are afforded no such luxury. They are constitutionally or customarily prevented from dis-
missing their colleagues, or, more commonly, are prevented from doing so by the exigencies of
factional and coalition politics. Only three Japanese prime ministers in the six decades since
the end of the Second World War have felt strong enough to dismiss a cabinet minister
outright.9 The Italian prime minister ‘has no constitutional power to sack individual ministers’
and, even if he had, sacking ministers would normally precipitate the fall of his government.10
In Norway, ‘it is also difﬁcult for the Prime Minister to dismiss ministers not belonging to his
or her own party without disrupting the often fragile compromises underlying the cabinet
formation’.11 The case of the Netherlands is extreme but by no means untypical:
The Prime Minister [of the Netherlands] cannot remove a minister or ‘reshufﬂe’ the Cabinet by
assigning ministers to other portfolios. The Prime Minister of the wartime government in exile
[in London] twice dismissed a minister without even consulting the Cabinet, but he was
6 Maurizio Cotta, ‘Italy: A Fragmented Government’, in Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Mu¨ller-Rommel,
eds, Cabinets in Western Europe, 2nd edn (Basingstoke, Hants.: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 136–56, at p. 149.
7 Peter Gerlich and Wolfgang C. Muller, ‘Austria: Routine and Ritual’, in Blondel and Mu¨ller-
Rommel, eds, Cabinets in Western Europe, pp. 157–70, at p. 164.
8 The Australian Labor party and the New Zealand Labour party’s traditional methods of choosing
cabinet ministers are described in Patrick Weller, First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in Westminster
Systems (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 74, 85–7. Kevin Rudd took advantage of Labor’s
overwhelming victory in the Australian federal election of November 2007 and, when he came to appoint
his cabinet, simply bypassed his party’s parliamentary caucus. See Peter Smith, ‘Rudd unveils hand-
picked cabinet’, Financial Times (London), 29 November 2007.
9 Shinoda, Leading Japan, pp. 62–3.
10 David Hine and Renato Finocchi, ‘The Italian Prime Minister’, in G. W. Jones, ed., West European
Prime Ministers (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 79–96, at p. 82. See also Cotta, ‘Italy: A Fragmented
Government’, p. 149; and Donatella Campus and Gianfranco Pasquino, ‘Leadership in Italy: The
Changing Role of Leaders in Elections and in Government’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies,
14 (2006), 25–40. Campus and Pasquino argue that in the second Italian republic those prime ministers
who have led coalitions of parties to power – notably Silvio Berlusconi – have greater power to determine
the composition of their cabinets than prime ministers who have not (pp. 32–3).
11 Svein Eriksen, ‘Norway: Ministerial Autonomy and Collective Responsibility’, in Blondel and
Mu¨ller-Rommel, eds, Cabinets in Western Europe, pp. 210–24, at p. 219.
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immediately criticized for such ‘Persian constitutional morals’ and after the war a parliamentary
inquiry rejected the claim that the Prime Minister should have the power of dismissal.12
And no Dutch prime minister since then has sought to reassert that claim. The phrase
‘Persian constitutional morals’ hints at despotism, but every British prime minister enjoys
precisely such despotic powers.
The British premier’s capacious power both to appoint and to dismiss his or her fellow
ministers has, of course, always been signiﬁcant. H. H. Asquith’s appointment of David
Lloyd George as chancellor of the exchequer in 1908 tilted the balance of the then Liberal
government sharply to the left, as Asquith knew it would, and accelerated the intro-
duction of the British welfare state. Stanley Baldwin’s unexpected appointment of
Winston Churchill as chancellor in 1924 reinforced Baldwin’s already declared determina-
tion to reunite the Conservative party and present it to the nation as a centrist party of good
government. In 1929, the incoming Labour prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, ﬁlled his
diary with gloomy reﬂections on the importunities of ambitious ofﬁce-seekers: ‘I have
broken hearts – one man all but fainted when I told him he could not get what he expected.’13
Clement Attlee’s cabinet appointments in 1945 did not indicate any disposition on his part to
be a dominant prime minister, but they did indicate a clear determination to prevent civil war
within the government by keeping two heavyweight ﬁgures who hated each other, Ernest
Bevin and Herbert Morrison, out of each other’s way.
All that is true. But it is also true that the prime minister’s power of appointment and
dismissal is almost certainly even more signiﬁcant now than it was a century ago or even
half a century ago. In the ﬁrst place, governments are now larger than they used to be,
with the prime minister having more posts to ﬁll – and, of course, to empty. Gordon
Brown appointed seventy-ﬁve House of Commons ministers in June 2007 compared with
Ramsay MacDonald’s thirty-eight in 1929 and Harold Macmillan’s ﬁfty-four as recently
as 1957.14 In the second place, the incidence of career politicians – men and women who
are not content to remain on the back benches but aspire to ministerial ofﬁce – is almost
certainly higher now than it was in previous generations. An old fact of the constitution –
the prime minister’s power to hire and ﬁre – has had added to it a new fact of political
sociology:
The great majority of British politicians [nowadays] are career politicians. They eat, breathe
and sleep politics. Most of them passionately want to be ministers; or, if they are already
ministers, they want to be promoted in the ministerial hierarchy, and they certainly do not
want to be demoted, shunted sideways or dismissed. It follows that the prime minister of the
day is in an exceedingly powerful position. He or she is the monopoly supplier of a good,
ministerial ofﬁce, which is iny short supply and for which there is an enormous demand. He
or she can exploit this monopoly position to inﬂuence the behaviour of backbenchers who
12 Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, 2nd edn
(Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave, 2005), p. 122.
13 Quoted in David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), p. 491. Mac-
Donald complained that he had had would-be ministers ‘in here weeping and even fainting’. See Hugh
Dalton, Call Back Yesterday: Memoirs, 1887–1931 (London: Frederick Muller, 1953), p. 217.
14 Computed in the case of Gordon Brown from the House of Commons Information Ofﬁce website
and in the cases of Ramsay MacDonald and Harold Macmillan from David Butler and Gareth Butler,
Twentieth-Century British Political Facts 1900–2000, 8th edn (Basingstoke, Hants.: Macmillan, 2000),
pp. 12–13 and 26–9. The totals in each case include the government’s law ofﬁcers but exclude the
government whips.
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want to be ministers and of ministers who want to be promoted and not to be dismissedy The
career politician’s ambition is the ambitious prime minister’s opportunity.15
Despite the centrality of the prime minister’s appointment and dismissal power,
academic political scientists have not paid much attention to it. They have noted its
existence and have readily acknowledged its central importance, but few of them have
investigated in any detail how prime ministers actually use their power. The treatment has
tended to be highly generalized. Almost the only exception is a decades-old article,
published in Parliamentary Affairs, by R. K. Alderman and J. A. Cross.16 The reasons for
political scientists’ reticence in this connection are obvious. Not only have prime ministers over
the decades appointed and dismissed thousands of individual ministers, including hundreds of
cabinet ministers, but they have had very little to say, at least publicly, about their reasons for
making the decisions they have. In some cases, they have probably not wanted their reasons to
be known. In others, they have probably been somewhat unclear themselves about their
reasons or have at any rate not felt any need to articulate them. In any case, no prime minister
could possibly allow himself to get into the position of having to explain and defend seriatim
his appointment and dismissal decisions (not to mention his decisions to reshufﬂe).
Political scientists are, therefore, largely left to fend for themselves: to try to divine
prime ministers’ motives from what little they have said in public and from the political
and personal circumstances that appear to have pertained at the time. In other words,
gathering systematic evidence in this ﬁeld is difﬁcult, and knowing how to interpret the
evidence – and how much reliance to place on one’s own interpretations – is even more
difﬁcult. Still, a serious attempt is worth making. The subject is too important to be left as
a kind of terra incognita or as a matter of mere gossip, anecdotage and speculation.
This article seeks in a modest way to open up the subject for enquiry. It explores the
ways in which prime ministers have used their power to dismiss cabinet ministers over
the last half century, during the period between 1957 and 2007. We acknowledge that the
article is limited in scope and also limited in time, though a half-century’s experience
should be enough to point to a number of general conclusions. It is also limited to the
prime minister’s dismissal power and does not deal, except initially, with his or her powers
to appoint, reshufﬂe and relocate. Because there are fewer outright dismissals, they attract
more attention, and evidence bearing on them is therefore easier to obtain. In any case,
the prime minister’s power to dismiss ministers is, as the two quotations at the beginning
of this article suggest, the prime minister’s most formidable power, potentially at least,
in his or her dealings with people who are already his ministerial colleagues. Finally, the
article is limited to dismissals from – and, in a few instances, demotions from – the cabinet.
It would be impossible to investigate in any detail prime ministers’ reasons for sacking junior
ministers: the sheer number of such dismissals has been very large, and in most cases the
reasons underlying them were at the time, and remain, wholly obscure. Who knows or even
wants to know why WilliamWhitlock ceased to be parliamentary under-secretary of state at
15 Anthony King, ‘The British Prime Ministership in the Age of the Career Politician’, in Jones, ed.,
West European Prime Ministers, pp. 25–47, at p. 38. On the changing character of Britain’s political elite,
see Anthony King, ‘The Rise of the Career Politician – And its Consequences’, British Journal of Political
Science, 11 (1981), 249–85; Peter Riddell, Honest Opportunists: The Rise of the Career Politician (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1993); and Peter Oborne, The Triumph of the Political Class (London: Simon &
Schuster, 2007).
16 R. K. Alderman and J. A. Cross, ‘The Reluctant Knife: Reﬂections on the Prime Minister’s Powers
of Dismissal’, Parliamentary Affairs, 38 (1985), 387–407.
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the Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce on 13 October 1969?17 In any case, cabinet ministers
are almost always more important both governmentally and politically than non-cabinet
ministers.
THE CRITERIA THAT PRIME MINISTERS USE
However, before we narrow our focus to concentrate on ministers’ departures from the
cabinet, we need to consider in general terms the considerations that prime ministers take
into account in making decisions about whether or not to employ particular individuals in
their government and the calculations they make concerning their own political position
relative to that of the individual or individuals they are thinking of employing – or not
employing. Every prime minister makes, in effect, some kind of cost–beneﬁt analysis every
time he or she decides to appoint or dismiss someone. The cost–beneﬁt analysis in question
may be simple, or it may be complex; it may be made consciously, semi-consciously or
largely unconsciously. But in some form or another it is bound to be made. At one extreme,
the prime minister will know ‘instinctively’ what he or she wants to do or must do. At the
other extreme, he or she may go to the trouble of writing out on the back of an envelope lists
of pros and cons relating to the possible appointment or dismissal of named individuals.
It goes without saying, moreover, that, despite the emphasis on decisions concerning
individuals in the preceding paragraph, the prime minister’s cost–beneﬁt analysis is
almost certain to involve more than one individual. It will often, especially at the time a
new government is formed or on the occasion of a major reshufﬂe, involve many. Given
the limited number of places in the cabinet, to appoint A means not appointing B, C or D,
and the prime minister must decide whether, under the circumstances, the appointment of
A (or B or C or D) is the most advantageous decision he can take. Similarly, if he or she is
thinking of dispensing with the services of X, he must consider whether he or she and the
government would be better or worse off if X were replaced by Y or Z. The costs and
beneﬁts are large in number and hard to weigh. It is no wonder that some prime ministers
ﬁnd it extraordinarily difﬁcult – and often very uncomfortable – to make the necessary
calculations. They sometimes act on impulse. Occasionally, a prime minister will delegate
some of his or her own decisions to one or more subordinates.18
What criteria do prime ministers use in making decisions about ministerial appoint-
ments and dismissals? There would appear to be four sorts of criteria, though each of the
four could easily be further reﬁned and subdivided. The four overlap and are by no means
mutually exclusive.19
17 At least in this case, it is possible to ﬁnd out. Through no fault of his own, Whitlock found himself
caught up in a dispute between two of Britain’s then Caribbean colonies, the islands of St Kitts and
Anguilla. The British government proposed that the two islands should form part of a merged dependency.
The Anguillans objected and declared their independence, and when Whitlock arrived on the island to try to
broker a deal he was chased off, shots having been ﬁred. He lost his job as a consequence, though some at the
time maintained that he was unfairly blamed for what had happened. See the obituary by Andrew Roth,
‘WilliamWhitlock: Loyal Labour MP who took the blame for a colonial humiliation’, Guardian, 2 November
2001.
18 It was rumoured that towards the end of his premiership, Tony Blair left Downing Street aides to get
on with the business of organizing the details of some of his reshufﬂes, at least with respect to junior
ministers.
19 The criteria listed here differ somewhat from those listed by other writers, notably in including
presentational capacity and in placing less emphasis on intra-party balance. Richard Rose, in The Prob-
lem of Party Government (London: Macmillan, 1974), sets out ‘at least three major criteria for making
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One is obviously governmental competence, the actual or possible future minister’s ability to
do the job in strictly Whitehall terms. Can he or she master a brief quickly? Can he or she
master one at all? Can he or she deal with ofﬁcials? Can he or she do business satisfactorily
with the prime minister and his or her other ministerial colleagues? Can he or she contribute
effectively (but not at too great length) to departmental and interdepartmental discussions,
not least at formal cabinet and sub-cabinet meetings? Can he or she negotiate successfully
with outside bodies and with Britain’s fellow members of the European Union? And so on.
Before appointing someone to a ministerial post, the prime minister, unless he happens to
know an individual well, can obviously do little more than make the best guess he can as to
whether the potential appointee possesses these qualities and, if so, in what combination.
Would-be ministers do not have to ﬁll in application forms, and there are no formal or even
informal interviews. Of course, once someone has served in government, even in a relatively
junior post, he or she will have acquired more of a track record. Even then, however, the
prime minister may well have had little personal contact with the individual in question and in
deciding whether to promote or dismiss him or her is likely to have to rely on the judgements
of ministerial colleagues, the whips and even civil servants. In this kind of setting, rumour,
prejudice, gossip and sheer happenstance can count for a lot.
A second criterion, which may or may not overlap with the ﬁrst, is political utility. Does the
minister or prospective minister bring political skills to the job? Does he bring with him political
nous? More importantly, does he or she bring with him a political constituency, one supportive
not only of the minister but of the government and ideally the prime minister? What is his or
her standing, if he or she has one, in the governing party? What is his or her standing, in the
improbable event that he or she has one, with the general public? How, if at all, is he or she rated
by ‘informed opinion’? How, more speciﬁcally, is he or she rated by speciﬁc sectoral publics such
as the City, the judiciary or the medical or teaching professions? Alternatively, is the person in
question politically or personally bad news, someone with whom the prime minister would
prefer his government not to be associated? For obvious reasons, this political-utility criterion is
often not important operationally: most would-be ministers, and even many actual ministers, do
not possess a well-developed political persona or reputation, either positive or negative. Prime
ministers seldom feel under great pressure either to appoint particular individuals or to retain
them. The most notable exceptions to this general rule we shall return to later.
A third criterion, which may well overlap with either or both of the previous two, is
presentational capacity. This particular criterion would once have related almost exclusively
(F’note continued)
ministerial appointments’: ‘representativeness in relation to political factions and tendencies as well as
social origins’, ‘loyalty to the Prime Minister’ and ‘ministerial competence’ (pp. 363–4). Rose offers a
similar list in ‘British Government: The Job at the Top’, in Richard Rose and Ezra Suleiman, eds,
Presidents and Prime Ministers (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), pp. 1–49, at p. 5.
Harold Wilson, in The Governance of Britain (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph,
1976), emphasized the desirability of having the various wings of the Labour Party represented in the
cabinet and also the need to have ministers who could ‘handle the House of Commons’ and had ‘a real
rapport with the party nationally, and above all in the country’ (p. 31). The fact that more recent writers
have had less to say about ministers’ role in the House of Commons and about the need to represent the
various wings of the governing party may reﬂect the declining (though still by no means negligible)
importance of the House of Commons, Margaret Thatcher’s ruthless exclusion of most ‘wets’ from her
cabinet and also the much reduced importance of organized (and even unorganized) factions inside the
contemporary Labour party. Concerning parliament, Peter Riddell puts the point bluntly: ‘The main
arena of British political debate is now the broadcasting studio rather than the chamber of the House of
Commons.’ See Peter Riddell, Parliament under Blair (London: Politico’s, 2000), p. 160.
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to parliament. Someone who could not perform with a minimal degree of competence in the
House of Commons or the House of Lords was unlikely to make it into the government of
the day and certainly not into the cabinet; and someone who, having been appointed to
ministerial ofﬁce, turned out to be incompetent in parliamentary terms, was unlikely to
survive for long. The purely parliamentary dimension of presentational ability is undoubt-
edly still important, but since at least the 1990s it has been joined and perhaps even
superseded by a mass-media dimension, one relating especially to radio and television. The
minister who can hold his or her own with John Humphrys or James Naughtie on BBC
Radio 4’s Today programme or stand up to Jeremy Paxman on BBC 2’s Newsnight is likely
to survive and even thrive. The person who is inarticulate, careless or easily ﬂustered in front
of a microphone or camera is unlikely to do either.
The fourth criterion is policy compatibility: compatibility, that is, with the substantive
views of the prime minister. Members of the governing party’s awkward squad or
adherents of one of its more extreme wings are unlikely to make it into the government
(unless it is to silence them or buy them off); and ministers who are unhappy with central
aspects of the government’s policies, and who express their unhappiness in public, are
unlikely to survive for long (or perhaps to want to survive for long). Fortunately, for most
prime ministers, this is not a criterion they have to attend to often. Most ministers and
potential ministers do not possess strongly held policy views that differ sharply from those
of the prime minister and the majority of the cabinet, and, even if they do, they are likely
to keep their dissentient views to themselves.20 Most upwardly mobile politicians, as the
Americans say, ‘get along by going along’. There are, however, exceptions, and we shall
encounter several of them later.
Although the four criteria just listed do overlap – in the sense that someone who meets
any one of them is likely to meet most of the others and also in the sense that success
under any one of these headings is likely to contribute to success under the others – it is
worth emphasizing that the four are, nevertheless, distinct. For example, Edward Heath
retained Margaret Thatcher as secretary of state for education (1970–74) because she was
competent in purely governmental terms and because he needed a woman in the cabinet,
but she was politically superﬂuous (apart from being a woman), inept presentationally
and increasingly out of sorts with the prime minister’s policies, though she mostly kept
the extent of her unhappiness to herself. To take a more recent example, John Prescott,
Tony Blair’s deputy prime minister for the whole of his period in ofﬁce (1997–2007),
was politically useful to Blair and had come to share his views on policy, but Blair was
far from holding him in high regard in purely Whitehall terms and regarded him in
presentational terms as being, at best, a mixed blessing.
In addition to these four main criteria, other considerations often come into play.
Personal affection and its opposite are not the least of them. Harold Wilson liked Barbara
Castle and was actually somewhat intimidated by her; he retained her in the government
and promoted her during both of his administrations. But James Callaghan disliked her,
found her irritating and sacked her the moment he took ofﬁce.21 Margaret Thatcher’s
20 One cabinet minister who largely kept her views to herself was Margaret Thatcher during her time as
a member of Edward Heath’s cabinet. On Thatcher’s uncharacteristic reticence during this period, see
John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher: The Grocer’s Daughter (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000), pp. 242–52.
21 On Harold Wilson’s relationship with Barbara Castle, see Anne Perkins, Red Queen: The Authorized
Biography of Barbara Castle (London: Macmillan, 2003), passim, and Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson
(London: HarperCollins, 1992), esp. pp. 334–8: ‘Barbara y would mother and scold him’ (p. 335). On
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fondness for Cecil Parkinson almost certainly led her to promote him and to retain him in
the cabinet for a time even though he became involved in an embarrassing personal
scandal that would probably have caused any other prime minister to let him go almost at
once.22 Struggles for power can also make a difference. Tony Blair and Gordon Brown
vied for power within the government during the whole of the 1997–2007 period. Blair
could not sack Brown, but he used most of his numerous reshufﬂes to reinforce the
position of his own people in the government and also, where he could, to sack, demote or
marginalize those whom he regarded as Brown’s allies.23
Some decisions concern only individuals, but, of course, as we noted a moment ago,
every prime minister also has to have regard to the composition of his cabinet as a whole.
Most prime ministers feel they have to take into account the balance of ideological and
factional forces within the governing party. Harold Wilson was acutely sensitive to such
matters, and even Margaret Thatcher, when she ﬁrst took ofﬁce in 1979, felt compelled
to include Conservative ‘wets’ as well as her own supporters in her administration.
Edward Heath was a rarity in seeming to feel he could ignore ideological and factional
considerations; Enoch Powell had large followings in both the country at large and
the Conservative party, but Heath ruthlessly excluded him.24 Although British prime
(F’note continued)
James Callaghan’s dismissal of her, see Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), pp. 478–9 – ‘she had no affection for Callaghan himself’ (p. 479) – and Perkins,
Red Queen, pp. 416–18: when Wilson resigned in 1976 ‘Barbara knew that of all the potential leaders
[Callaghan] was the one with the least time for her’ (p. 417).
22 On Margaret Thatcher’s relationship with Cecil Parkinson, see Hugo Young, One of Us: A Bio-
graphy of Margaret Thatcher, ﬁnal edn (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 313–15: ‘He made a fussing,
worried, preoccupied woman feel rather luxuriously at ease’ (p. 315). On the circumstances of his
retention in the cabinet, at least in the short term, see Young, One of Us, pp. 342–14. Parkinson’s own
account of his temporary retention and subsequent departure is contained in Cecil Parkinson, Right at the
Centre: An Autobiography (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1992), chap. 12. So fond was Thatcher of
Parkinson, and so respectful was she of his abilities, that she restored him to cabinet ofﬁce a few years
later.
23 For example, Andrew Rawnsley, an unusually well-informed journalist, notes that ‘As the [July
1998] reshufﬂe was announced, it became clear that Blair was carpet-bombing the network of supporters
Brown had placed in the governmenty The partisan purpose of the exercise was underlined by Blair’s
refusal to give any balancing jobs to MPs, even of promotion-worthy ability, associated with Brown.’ See
Andrew Rawnsley, Servants of the People: The Inside Story of New Labour (London: Hamish Hamilton,
2000), pp. 163–4. Another well-informed journalist, James Naughtie, adds: ‘At each following reshufﬂe,
the counting went on: how many Blairites in, how many Brownites out?’ See James Naughtie, The Rivals:
The Intimate Story of a Political Marriage (London: Fourth Estate, 2001), pp. 116–17.
24 Heath’s exclusion of Powell gives the lie to the oft-repeated assertion that there are some individuals
who are so powerful within their party that they are impossible to leave out. Although Powell
undoubtedly had a substantial following in the Conservative party, and although Heath was well aware
that he had one, Heath as party leader in opposition had already sacked him from the shadow cabinet
following his famous 1968 anti-immigration ‘rivers of blood’ speech. To have nevertheless appointed him
to the new Conservative cabinet in 1970 would have made the new prime minister look inconsistent, feeble
and ridiculous and would also have incurred the ire of most of his senior colleagues and probably a
majority of Conservative MPs. Not only would it have divided the parliamentary party, but some senior
Conservatives, including Iain Macleod, would probably have refused to sit round the cabinet table with
him. Fortunately for Heath, the strength of his position as the man who had just led the Conservative
party to victory in a general election meant that he could afford to exclude Powell at virtually no cost to
himself. Heath’s account of Powell’s behaviour in his memoirs – The Course of My Life: My Auto-
biography (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998), pp. 290–4 – is excoriating. He adds that, after his
sacking of Powell, ‘We never spoke again’ (p. 293). John Campbell, in his life of Heath, does not even
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ministers, unlike their counterparts in federal countries such as Austria, Australia,
Canada and to a lesser extent Germany, are not under great pressure to appoint men and
women from all parts of the country, they nevertheless avoid skewing their cabinet too
conspicuously towards London and the southeast of England. Every cabinet contains
northerners, at least one Scot and at least one Welsh person (even though, sometimes,
when the Conservatives are in power, the individuals in question may represent English
constituencies).25
Gender matters. Clement Attlee in his day could afford to say airily that ‘nowadays, if
you can, you should have some women in’, but by the end of the twentieth century the
presence of a number of women was deemed essential.26 Sexual orientation seems to
matter less than it did; or at least gay men and women who have come out are clearly
more acceptable than they once were. There is no pressure to include them, but equally
there is no pressure to exclude them. Early in Tony Blair’s administration, one of his
Downing Street aides was heard to wonder aloud how many gay men Blair could afford
to have in his cabinet. To have a very large number might make the cabinet look – how
should he put it? – a little queer. He himself did not much care, but he did wonder. Age
also matters. Quite apart from any tendency in recent years to value youth more highly
than age, all prime ministers have every incentive to promote backbenchers into the
government and to promote junior ministers within the government, and one obvious way
to do that is to stand down older ministers and to appoint younger ones. Ambitious
young men and women clamour to join the government. Older men and women are the
least likely to feel aggrieved at being asked to go.27
(F’note continued)
bother to mention that Heath did not offer Powell a job; see John Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), pp. 296–9. Powell himself ‘realised immediately that, after Wilson, he
had been the great loser of the election’: Simon Heffer, Like the Roman: The Life of Enoch Powell
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), p. 566.
25 Because of the Labour party’s historic electoral predominance in Scotland and Wales, Labour
prime ministers have seldom had any difﬁculty appointing competent ministers from those two nations.
Conservative prime ministers have latterly found it more difﬁcult. When John Major left ofﬁce in 1997,
the secretary of state for Wales sat for the English constituency of Richmond (Yorkshire). The political
history of what used to be the German Democratic Republic has meant that, despite Angela Merkel, post-
reuniﬁcation German chancellors have found it difﬁcult to appoint more than a few cabinet ministers
from that part of the Federal Republic.
26 Clement Attlee is quoted in Francis Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Post-war
Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Earl Attlee (London: Heinemann, 1961), p. 80. As recently as 1970, there was
only one woman, Margaret Thatcher, in Edward Heath’s cabinet. The cabinet that Tony Blair appointed
in 1997 contained ﬁve women, and by the end of his time in ofﬁce the number had increased to eight. His
predecessor, John Major, was conscious of not having any women in his ﬁrst cabinet but says in his
memoirs that he did not want to engage in tokenism and instead appointed a number of women to junior
ministerial ofﬁce so that he could appoint women to the cabinet on merit in the future: John Major, The
Autobiography (London: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 213. More generally, see Richard Cracknell, ‘Women in
Parliament and Government’, House of Commons Library Standard Note: SN/SG/01250 (London: House
of Commons, 2008).
27 That said, Barbara Castle (see fn. 21 above) felt mightily aggrieved at being asked to go. She recounts
in her memoirs – Fighting All the Way (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 489 – how the prime minister, James
Callaghan, summoned her to tell her that he was not appointing her to his cabinet: ‘I had, he said, to make
way for younger people. I bit back the riposte: ‘‘Then why not start with yourself?’’ After all, he was two
years younger than I and I was not seeking to be Prime Minister.’ On the issue of age generally, see the
brief reference in Samuel Berlinski, Torun Dewan and Keith Dowding, ‘The Length of Ministerial Tenure
in the United Kingdom, 1945–97’, British Journal of Political Science, 37 (2007), 245–62, p. 258.
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EXPLOITING THE POWER TO DISMISS
With those general observations on the criteria that prime ministers use in making both
appointments and dismissals by way of background, we now focus our attention exclus-
ively on dismissals. From this point onward, our focus is on the ways in which, and the
extent to which, different prime ministers used their dismissal power during the half
century between 1957 and 2007.
If, however, we are to focus on dismissals, we need to be able to distinguish between
two separate categories of ministerial departures. We need to be able to distinguish
between those occasions on which departing ministers left the cabinet of their own
volition and those on which the ministers who departed had no wish to go but whom the
prime minister, by one means or another, forced to go. In other words, we need to be able
to distinguish between occasions on which departing ministers jumped and those on
which they were pushed. For that purpose, we need to examine the circumstances in
which all of the ministers who left the cabinet between 1957 and 2007 actually did so.
Between Harold Macmillan’s coming to ofﬁce in January 1957 and Tony Blair’s leaving
it in June 2007, there were 132 occasions on which cabinet ministers left the cabinet for
reasons other than their political party’s loss of a general election, the loss of their own
seat in the House of Commons or death.28 In order to ﬁnd out why each of them left, we
trawled the biographies, memoirs and diaries of upwards of four dozen former cabinet
ministers as well as the large volume of biographies and memoirs of the eight prime
ministers under whom they served. Usually one or more of these sources provided the
answer to the question we were asking. When no answer was forthcoming, we consulted
accounts of the relevant ministers’ departures from ofﬁce in the contemporary press.
On one occasion, when even that source proved unhelpful, we approached the ofﬁcial
biographer of a former prime minister to enquire about an individual. The biographer
kindly telephoned the former prime minister, who, however, admitted that he could not
recall why the individual had left the cabinet.29 In the end, we were left with only one
person about whose departure from the cabinet there were such conﬂicting accounts that
we felt unable to include him in our analysis.30
28 The number 132, like most of the other aggregate numbers in this article, is derived from the data set
out in Butler and Butler, Twentieth-Century British Political Facts, and David Butler and Gareth Butler,
British Political Facts since 1979 (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave, 2006). The total of 132 departures
includes instances when the departing cabinet minister, having served under one prime minister, ceased to
serve under that prime minister’s immediate successor even though the same political party remained in
power. We take the view that, whatever the formal position, the politics of the situation, from both the
departing ministers’ point of view and the prime minister’s, remains essentially the same.
29 The ofﬁcial biographer in question was Kenneth O. Morgan, whose help we gratefully acknowledge.
The former prime minister, who was in full possession of his faculties, was James Callaghan. The minister
in question was Lord Shepherd (Malcolm Shepherd), the lord privy seal. We have no reason to doubt the
statement in The Times’ obituary of Lord Shepherd (6 April 2001) that he left the government simply in
order to resume his business career.
30 The one minister was David Hunt, who left John Major’s government in 1995. On the one hand, one
of Major’s biographers suggests on the basis of private information that Hunt resigned for personal
reasons and that Major had actually pencilled him in to move to another cabinet-level ofﬁce; see Anthony
Seldon with Lewis Baston,Major: A Political Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997), p. 589. On the
other hand, contemporary press accounts ﬂatly assert that he was sacked. For example, Andrew Marr
wrote in the Independent (6 July 1995): ‘The contrast with poor David Hunt is instructive. He got a job
with similar potential last time round. He has been conspicuously, indeed excessively, loyal. He was
Major’s man. But he was also no good; so the Prime Minister quite brutally sacked him.’ Although we
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Leaving that one minister aside, we then divided the remaining 131 departures into four
categories: those occasions on which the individual left the cabinet largely voluntarily (i.e.
jumped), those on which the individual left largely involuntarily (i.e. was pushed), those
on which the individual resigned pre-emptively (i.e. jumped before being pushed) and – an
especially small category – those occasions on which the individual was, to use the
language of the law, ‘constructively dismissed’ (i.e. was placed by the prime minister in a
position so awkward or humiliating that, without being formally dismissed, he felt
compelled to resign).31
The ministers who left the cabinet largely voluntarily – a total of 44 – did so for a wide
variety of reasons, including old age, ill health, the belief that they could make more
money outside the government, a genuine desire to spend more time with their family
and unhappiness at the prime minister’s and the government’s policies. To cite only a
few examples, Iain Macleod and Enoch Powell refused to remain in Sir Alec Douglas-
Home’s cabinet because they disapproved of the way in which Home had been chosen
Conservative party leader; Frank Cousins, a former trade union leader, quit Harold
Wilson’s cabinet in 1966 in order to return to his union and because he was unhappy
with government policy; Edmund Dell left James Callaghan’s cabinet in 1978 because he
did not much enjoy politics and preferred to return to the private sector; Michael
Heseltine walked out of Margaret Thatcher’s cabinet in 1986 because, although he did
enjoy politics, he was furious with the prime minister for, as he maintained, treating him
and the cabinet badly; and Robin Cook resigned from Tony Blair’s cabinet in 2003
because he objected to the Blair government’s decision to invade Iraq.32 This category,
comprising those departing voluntarily, would be worth exploring in detail because such
an exploration would throw light on (among other things) the changing structure of
political careers in Britain; but, because our present focus is on prime ministers’ use
of their dismissal power, we do not pursue this line of enquiry here. A complete list of
those whom we judge to have resigned voluntarily between 1957 and 2007 is set out in
Appendix 1.
That leaves a total of 87 occasions when we believe the individual in question was
dismissed outright, resigned pre-emptively or else was constructively dismissed. The
names of all those individuals are set out in Table 1. They are divided within Table 1 into
two categories: those whose dismissal, whatever precise form it took, had little or nothing
to do with questions of policy or ideology and those whose dismissal was more closely
related to substantive policy matters. Table 2 indicates the mean number of ministers
leaving the cabinet, in toto, during each year of our various prime ministers’ incumbency,
(F’note continued)
had on a number of occasions to exercise our own judgement, on no other occasion did we encounter such
a stark conﬂict of evidence.
31 Leaving the case of David Hunt aside, the total number of departures was 131, but the total number
of individuals who departed was only 126, ﬁve of them having departed twice: Cecil Parkinson (1983,
1990), Peter Brooke (1992, 1994), Peter Mandelson (1998, 2001), Alan Milburn (2003, 2005) and David
Blunkett (2004, 2005).
32 See, in chronological order, Robert Shepherd, Iain Macleod (London: Hutchinson, 1994), chap. 13;
Geoffrey Goodman, The Awkward Warrior: Frank Cousins, His Life and Times (London: Davis-Poynter,
1979), chap. 24; Robert Sheldon, ‘Edmund Emanuel Dell’, in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds,
The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 736–8;
Michael Heseltine, Life in the Jungle: My Autobiography (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2000), chap. 15;
and Robin Cook, The Point of Departure (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003), chap 7.
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Dismissals on policy or
ideological grounds
Harold Macmillan (12) (1)












Sir Alec Douglas-Home (0) (0)
Harold Wilson (1964–70) (9) (2)
Tom Fraser (1965) Douglas Jay (1967)





Patrick Gordon Walker (1968)
Judith Hart (1969)*
Anthony Greenwood (1969)*
Edward Heath (1) (0)
Michael Noble (1970)*
Harold Wilson (1974–76) (0) (0)
James Callaghan (4) (1)




Margaret Thatcher (12) (10)
Angus Maude (1981) Norman St John Stevas (1981)
Baroness Young (1983) Lord Soames (1981)
David Howell (1983) Sir Ian Gilmour (1981)
Cecil Parkinson (1983)y Mark Carlisle (1981)
Lord Cockﬁeld (1984) Francis Pym (1983)
Peter Rees (1985) James Prior (1984)y
Patrick Jenkin (1985) John Biffen (1987)
Lord Hailsham (1987) Nigel Lawson (1989)y
Michael Jopling (1987) Nicholas Ridley (1990)y
Lord Havers (1987) Sir Geoffrey Howe (1990)y
John Moore (1989)
Paul Channon (1990)
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the mean number of ministers who were dismissed and the mean number of those who
were dismissed on policy-related or ideological grounds. The purpose of these tables is to
enable us to see whether – reverting to Peter Hennessy’s terminology – some prime
ministers have been more prone than others to chop off their colleagues’ ministerial
heads. The purpose is also to see whether different prime ministers have assigned – or
appear to have assigned – differing weights to policy matters in deciding whether or not to
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ideological grounds















Tony Blair (20) (1)




















*The ministers indicated by an asterisk were dismissed from the cabinet but were offered and
accepted ministerial posts outside the cabinet.
yPre-emptive resignation.
yConstructive dismissal.
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In a few cases, of course, it is open to dispute whether a speciﬁc individual departed
voluntarily or under compulsion or whether an individual departed for reasons that
should be coded as policy-related/ideological or for reasons that should be coded as non-
political. Two cases in point relate to the Westland affair of 1986, when two members of
the cabinet abruptly departed within days of one another. In the case of Michael
Heseltine, although Margaret Thatcher’s behaviour provoked him beyond endurance, we
code his departure as voluntary. The prime minister did not seek his resignation, did not
realize how badly he thought she was treating him and was astonished when he went.
In the case of Leon Brittan, we also code his departure as voluntary because, although
his position had probably become untenable, the prime minister, Margaret Thatcher,
professed that she did not want him to go and actually spent time trying to persuade him
to stay.33 Questions could similarly be raised about our decisions to code the departures
of Douglas Jay, Richard Marsh and Nicholas Ridley as policy-related/ideological.34








Mean number of dismissals
per year on policy/
ideological grounds
Macmillan 2.7 1.9 0.1
Home 2.0 zero zero
Wilson (1964–70) 2.8 1.9 0.4
Heath 0.8 0.3 zero
Wilson (1974–76) zero zero zero
Callaghan 2.6 1.6 0.3
Thatcher 3.0 1.9 0.9
Major 2.6 2.2 zero
Blair 3.3 2.1 0.1
Notes: The length of each prime ministership is measured in years to the nearest day. Thus,
Margaret Thatcher served as prime minister for 11 years and 209 days or 11.57 years. The
ﬁgures relating to each prime ministership are calculated on this basis. The category of
‘departures’ from the cabinet excludes deaths in ofﬁce and ministers who lost their seat at an
election, but it includes those ministers demoted to ministerial ofﬁce outside the cabinet. It also
includes David Hunt, whose departure we were unable to code. The category of ‘dismissals’
from the cabinet includes pre-emptive resignations, constructive dismissals and those ministers
demoted to ministerial ofﬁce outside the cabinet (see text relating to Table 1).
33 See the nuanced account of Brittan’s departure by Hugo Young in One of Us, pp. 453–4.
34 Wilson described the scene of Jay’s sacking in his memoir of his ﬁrst government: ‘We met in the
station-master’s ofﬁce [at Plymouth] and, understandably, he took it badlyy But he was now over sixty,
above the ‘‘retiring age’’ that I had informally laid down, except for very special cases.’ See Harold
Wilson, The Labour Government 1964–1970: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, and
Michael Joseph, 1971), p. 427. Wilson claimed that he sacked Jay for the reason just given, Jay’s age, but
no one believed him. Certainly, Jay did not. In his own memoirs – Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune: A
Political Record (London: Hutchinson, 1980) – he insisted, partly on the basis of a conversation with an
unnamed senior minister who had been involved, that ‘the general public belief that my attitude on the
EEC made it impossible for me to remain in this Government was basically correct’ (p. 408). In any case,
as Jay himself readily acknowledged, he was not strong enough politically to give Wilson cause for
concern. Wilson’s biographer, Ben Pimlott, agrees with Jay that his opposition to Britain’s joining the
King and Allen 263
However, the number of such contestable cases is, fortunately, quite few, sufﬁciently few
not to disturb the central thrust of our conclusions.
Tables 1 and 2, taken together, suggest that, year on year, the average number of
departures from British cabinets has tended to increase over the past half century. The
average number of dismissals from the cabinet, as distinct from departures on other
grounds, has also tended to increase. Thatcher dismissed her colleagues at the same high
rate as Macmillan and Wilson (during the ﬁrst of his two premierships); and both Major
and Blair, year on year, dismissed more of their colleagues than any of their post-1957
predecessors. It would seem that in recent decades British politics at the top has become
somewhat tougher and more turbulent than in the past. The explanation probably lies in
some compound of prime ministers’ increased ruthlessness and the inability of a gradually
increasing number of ministers to meet the demands that the prime minister, the media
and their sheer administrative workloads place upon them. It is also the case that long-
lived administrations of the same party have become more common in recent years, and
prime ministers who have been in ofﬁce for a considerable period of time, or whose party
has been in ofﬁce for a considerable period of time, are more likely than others to dismiss
ministers who seem to them to have outlived their usefulness.35
But the most startling ﬁndings set out in Tables 1 and 2 concern the extent to which
Margaret Thatcher stands out. Most prime ministers would appear to use their powers of
appointment and dismissal to recruit and retain talent, to hold their party together and to
(F’note continued)
EEC was the root cause of his dismissal. He also agrees with Jay that by this time Jay was a largely isolated
ﬁgure: ‘WhenWilson cut him down, he had no powerful defenders.’ See Ben Pimlott,Harold Wilson (London:
HarperCollins, 1992), pp. 467–8. On Richard Marsh, see his own account in Off the Rails: An Autobiography
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), chap. 9, where he attributes his dismissal from the cabinet to his
opposition to the prime minister’s support for the In Place of Strife proposals (see fn. 56 below). On Nicholas
Ridley, see his account in ‘My Style of Government’: The Thatcher Years (London: Hutchinson, 1991),
pp. 223–4. The Ridley case is certainly arguable. On the one hand, Thatcher let him go because he had gravely
embarrassed the government by making offensive remarks about Germany and because he had already made
known his intention to stand down at the next election. On the other, his reported remarks about Germany
clearly cut athwart the government’s approach to Britain’s relations with Germany, which were meant to be
businesslike if not exactly cordial. Thatcher, perhaps embarrassed by not having stood by Ridley, an old friend
and ally, makes no mention of the episode in her memoirs. Hugo Young discusses the close relationship
between the two of them in One of Us, pp. 572–3.
35 Recent prime ministers have typically remained in ofﬁce for considerably longer than most of their
twentieth-century predecessors. Thatcher served for nearly twelve years, Major for more than six and
Blair for almost exactly ten. Of the premiers covered in this article, only one other prime minister served
as long: Macmillan, who held ofﬁce for nearly seven years. The ﬁrst-named premiers therefore had longer
time in which to dismiss ministers and also to see them depart of their own accord. Largely for that
reason, the average numbers of departures and dismissals reported in Table 2 conceal the fact that the
absolute number of departures and dismissals was substantially greater during the second half of our
period than during the ﬁrst. During the twenty-ﬁve years following Macmillan’s accession to the pre-
miership in 1957, only 52 cabinet ministers left the cabinet, 35 of them having been dismissed. In contrast,
during the ensuing twenty-ﬁve years, no fewer than 80 cabinet ministers left the cabinet, 52 of them having
been dismissed. Premiers inheriting governments of their own party that have been in ofﬁce for some time
and premiers who have themselves been in ofﬁce for some time have shown a marked disposition to sack
an above-average number of ministers. Callaghan sacked ﬁve colleagues when he took over from Wilson
in 1976 (Labour under Harold Wilson having been in power during much of the previous decade), and
Gordon Brown in 2007 either sacked or showed no signs of wishing to re-employ no fewer than seven of
Tony Blair’s cabinet colleagues and demoted two others. Thatcher and Blair, during their last two years in
ofﬁce, each dispensed with the services of at least four of their colleagues.
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maximize their cabinet’s appeal to the electorate. Margaret Thatcher, it would seem, was
more single-minded. She wanted a cabinet that she found ideologically and temperamentally
congenial, and she did not want a cabinet that contained men and women who stood in her
way or who appeared likely to stand in her way. As the right-hand column in Table 1 shows,
she sacked twice as many cabinet ministers on policy-related grounds as all of her post-1957
predecessors and successors put together; and she sacked almost as many cabinet ministers
on policy-related grounds as on grounds of incompetence, age, scandal or whatever. She did
not axe ministers at a signiﬁcantly higher rate than several other prime ministers in our
study, but she axed far more of them because, quite simply, they disagreed with her and she
with them. Her behaviour reﬂected both the ideological divisions within the Conservative
party during her time and her own determination, as she famously put it, ‘to have together-
ness’: ‘As Prime Minister, I could not waste time having internal arguments.’36 Had she
wasted time having internal arguments, it is at least arguable that she would not have
accomplished as much as she did from her point of view.
THE CALCULATIONS THAT PRIME MINISTERS MAKE
In making decisions about whether or not to dismiss individual cabinet ministers, prime
ministers inevitably make calculations, some of them delicate, a large proportion of them
involving a substantial degree of uncertainty. Among other things, prime ministers calculate
– they have no choice but to calculate – the strength of their own political position relative to
that of the individuals they are considering dismissing. Their calculations in this regard may
be accurate, or they may not be. Success and even survival for any prime minister depends in
part on how shrewd and well informed he or she is in judging the balance of the political
forces in play. Am I, or am I not, strong enough politically to oust that particular individual?
Many prime ministers over the past half century have been politically weak and have
known they were weak. Sir Alec Douglas-Home inherited a divided Conservative party,
many of whose members were doubtful about the legitimacy of his choice as party leader
and also about his personal abilities. He was not in a position – and he knew he was not in
a position – to sack any signiﬁcant ﬁgure.37 Harold Wilson was in an immensely strong
position – and knew he was – during the ﬁrst three years of his 1964–70 premiership; but,
following the 1967 devaluation of sterling, he was in a much weaker position – and was
conscious that he was.38 Both James Callaghan, during all of his short premiership
between 1976 and 1979, and John Major, during almost all of his long one between 1990
and 1997, knew that they were not personally strong enough to oust any of their senior
colleagues, however exasperating they found them.39 Major thought several of his senior
36 Quoted in Hennessy, The Prime Minister, p. 401.
37 Of course, the position would have been transformed had Home led the Conservatives to victory at
the 1964 general election. But in the meantime, he had to coexist, sometimes uncomfortably, with the man
who had been widely expected to succeed Macmillan and who made no secret of the fact that he did not
rate highly Home’s intellectual abilities, R. A. Butler. See D. R. Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home (London:
Sinclair-Stevenson, 1996), esp. pp. 319–20.
38 On Wilson’s loss of authority, especially following the devaluation of sterling in November 1967, see
Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pp. 503–9. Pimlott writes (p. 509): ‘Here was a new phenomenon in British
politics: a prime minister with little support in the country, the press or the Government, who survived
only because of the inertia of his party, and the lack of a mechanism for getting rid of him.’
39 How precarious Callaghan found his own position and that of his government during most of his
premiership, following his brief honeymoon, is indicated by the tone and content of his memoirs, Time
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colleagues were ‘bastards’ (his word), but he recognized that if he got rid of any of them,
his divided party would become even more fractious than it already was and that his
position, already under threat, would be rendered even less secure.40 The political self-
assessments of those four men were all accurate.
Intriguingly, the only post-1957 prime minister whose political position was impregnable,
and who judged accurately that it was, was Edward Heath, who held ofﬁce between 1970 and
1974.41 Following the sudden death of his ﬁrst chancellor of the exchequer, Iain Macleod, in
the summer of 1970, Heath was secure in the knowledge that he had led his party to victory in
the previous election, that he would almost certainly lead it to victory in the next election and
that he had no serious rivals within his party for either power or inﬂuence. Partly for that
reason, his was the most completely dominant premiership of the entire post-war period.
Tony Blair occupied a roughly comparable position – and knew he did – throughout most of
his long premiership, though, as we shall see later, his situation was constrained – and he
knew it was constrained – in a way, and to an extent, that Heath’s never was.
Prime ministers can, however, make mistakes. They may miscalculate. At the height of
his power, Harold Macmillan was able in 1958 to dismiss as ‘a little local difﬁculty’ the
resignation of his chancellor and two junior Treasury ministers, but four years later, when
he sacked a third of his cabinet, he discovered to his cost that by this time his position was
even less secure than he imagined it to be. But at least Macmillan did recognize that his
position was insecure.42 Margaret Thatcher towards the end (as it turned out) of her
premiership evinced no such recognition. In the ﬁrst years of her time in ofﬁce at the
height of her power, she had sacked ministers – mostly so-called ‘wet’ Conservatives –
with impunity, and as time went on she seemed to suppose that her power was still at its
(F’note continued)
and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), esp. Part 5. At one point (p. 435), he notes that he was aware of two
groups of ministers who, in a time of crisis, were discussing policy proposals at odds with those of the
chancellor. He goes on: ‘It was apparent that if the two groups were to coalesce the Chancellor [Denis
Healey] would not have a majority for his negotiating stance. He was very hard-pressed throughout this
period and I did not know what his reaction might be if the Cabinet overturned himy [The] government
could not have survived the resignation of the Chancellor.’
40 A whole chapter of John Major’s memoirs is actually entitled ‘The ‘‘Bastards’’ ’: Major, The
Autobiography, chap. 15. Major recounts (p. 343) that, gossiping with a television journalist before an
open microphone that he did not know was open, he said: ‘Just think it through from my point of view.
You are the prime minister with a majority of eighteen, a party that is still harking back to the golden age
that never was and is now invented. I could bring in other people. But where do you think this poison is
coming from? From the dispossessed and the never-possessed. You and I can think of ex-ministers who
are causing all sorts of trouble. Do we want three more of the bastards out there?’ Newspapers quickly
identiﬁed the three ministers they believed Major was referring to. Major sacked none of the three, though
one subsequently resigned.
41 Anthony King makes that claim in The British Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
p. 316. John Campbell in Edward Heath (p. 302) remarks apropos Iain Macleod’s sudden death that
‘Macleod was the one senior colleague with a mind of his own and the independence to stand up to the
Prime Minister when necessary, to whose advice he would always have listened. It was increasingly a
weakness of the Government that Heath was almost entirely surrounded by ministers who owed their
position solely to himself’.
42 On the events of January 1958 (the ‘little local difﬁculty’) and July 1962 (instantly dubbed ‘the night
of the long knives’), see Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957–1986 (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 70–5 and
chap. 12. Horne makes it clear that in 1962 Macmillan believed that, because of a sagging economy, poor
local election results and poor opinion-poll ratings, both he and his government were in serious political
trouble. On p. 340, he quotes Macmillan as writing in his diary, ‘Our stock is low’.
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height. She failed to recognize, until it was too late, the numerous signs that it was
waning. Her misreading of the strength of her position cost her her job.43
In making decisions about whom to sack, prime ministers thus estimate – accurately or
inaccurately – their own strength; but of course, in addition, they must estimate – also
accurately or inaccurately – the political strength and determination of others. Prime
ministers’ calculations are never absolute, peculiar to themselves; they are always relative,
raising questions pertaining, to be sure, to themselves, but also to other politicians. Or at
least their calculations, in their own interests, should always be relative.
Most cabinet ministers, it must be said, are expendable, and both the prime minister
and the ministers in question know it. Despite their formal eminence and large motor
cars, most ministers, even cabinet ministers, are relatively small creatures – gerbils, so to
speak – in the political jungle. Their departure from ofﬁce is likely to be agonizing for
themselves, and, if their personal relations have been close, the business of sacking them
may even be agonizing for the man or woman who sacks them. But otherwise nobody
much notices. Most cabinet ministers’ governmental competence is unremarkable and
unlikely to be any greater than that of whoever succeeds them. Their political utility is
likely to be minimal or non-existent. Their presentational skills are also likely to be
unremarkable, and most of those who are inclined to disagree with the prime minister on
policy matters usually keep their mouths shut; and, whether or not they do that, they are
very likely – for the reasons just given – to be eminently dismissible from the prime
minister’s point of view. As Peter Hennessy said, in most cases it is merely a matter of ‘off-
with-their-heads’. Lest that judgement seem unduly harsh – or, worse, inaccurate – the
reader is invited to peruse the relevant pages of the various editions of British Political
Facts. Which prime minister paid any kind of political price, or even seemed likely to pay
any kind of political price, for sacking (to name but a few) Fred Lee, Gordon Campbell,
Stan Orme, Peter Rees, John Patten or David Clark? Even better known members of the
cabinet than they were seldom have political clout sufﬁcient to make a prime minister
desist from sacking them if he or she is so minded.
Other ministers are more governmentally competent and do have some political utility
and presentational capacity but can be dispensed with all the same. Douglas Jay was a
well-known and reasonably competent minister, but Harold Wilson sacked him in 1967
because he thought Jay was a nuisance and believed, rightly, that Jay, once sacked, would
not be in a position to make trouble.44 Barbara Castle was better known, better liked and
at least as competent as Jay, but James Callaghan, newly installed as prime minister in
1976, reckoned, rightly, that he could sack her with impunity: his political position at that
moment was impregnable, and she, although she had many personal and political friends,
43 The fullest account of Thatcher’s political demise is Alan Watkins, A Conservative Coup: The Fall of
Margaret Thatcher (London: Duckworth, 1991). Watkins provides ample evidence of the draining away
of Thatcher’s personal authority. For example, on pp. 8–9 he describes how one backbench MP, ‘the
Conservative Party’s self-appointed parliamentary psephologist y sniffed the air, produced his pocket
calculator, put his ﬁnger to the wind and pronounced Mrs Thatcher dead.’ Another Conservative MP,
accused afterwards of exaggerating the rate at which the prime minister was losing support in the party,
riposted: ‘You weren’t there, old boy, and you’re talking absolute balls. Her support was turning away so
fast that by the end she’d have been lucky to have 90 f- - - - - - votes.’ Robert Shepherd in The Power
Brokers: The Tory Party and Its Leaders (London: Hutchinson, 1991) quotes yet another Conservative
MP as saying ‘that the talk about divisions in the party was true and that it wasn’t the poll tax, it wasn’t
Michael Heseltine, it wasn’t Europe, it was her’ (p. 1).
44 See fn. 34 above.
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had no substantial body of people who could truthfully be called political allies.45 In the
aftermath of the Falklands War in 1983, Margaret Thatcher sacked her well-respected
and popular foreign secretary, Francis Pym: she was then at the zenith of her power and
calculated, rightly, that Pym was far too loyal and difﬁdent to make trouble.46 Tony Blair
was able to sack Charles Clarke as home secretary in 2006 despite the fact that his power
as prime minister was already waning: he reckoned that he would pay a heavier price
politically for keeping Clarke at that ofﬁce than for moving him elsewhere or throwing
him out.47 Instances such as these – of ministers who were not totally negligible but were
nevertheless expendable – could be multiplied almost indeﬁnitely.
However, there is a third category of ministers, much smaller than either of the other
two, whom prime ministers, if they are well advised, treat more warily. This category
comprises the men and women (mostly men) whom Conservative politicians several
generations ago began to refer to as ‘big beasts of the jungle’.48 Historically, there have
been remarkably few such beasts. Of the 222 individuals who served in the cabinet in the
half century between 1957 and 2007, probably fewer than two dozen should, in our view,
be assigned to that category.49
45 Her old friend Michael Foot, in particular, did try to persuade Callaghan to keep her in the
administration, but neither Foot himself nor any other signiﬁcant ﬁgure showed any signs of going public,
let alone of resigning, if he let her go. See Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 478–9.
46 Thatcher’s account in her memoirs of her sacking of Pym oozes contempt: ‘In following Peter Carrington
with Francis Pym as Foreign Secretary I had exchanged an amusing Whig for a gloomy one. Even the
prospect of a landslide during the [1983] election made him utter dire warningsy I hoped he would consent
to become Speaker and I still believe that he would have done the job welly But in any case he was having
none of it. He preferred to go to the back-benches where he was a not very effective critic of the Government.’
See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 306–7.
47 In fact, Blair did not want to lose Clarke as a member of the cabinet and offered him several
alternative posts. He was disappointed, even dismayed, when Clarke declined all of them. But Blair was
not willing to see Clarke remain at the Home Ofﬁce and preferred to see him on the back benches rather
than in that particular ofﬁce. See Alan Travis, ‘Released terror suspect sealed home secretary’s fate’,
Guardian, 6 May 2006.
48 At least in connection with British politics, the phrase ‘big beasts of the jungle’ – or, alternatively, ‘great
beasts of the jungle’ – appears to have originated with Sir Michael Fraser (later Lord Fraser of Kilmorack), a
senior Conservative party ofﬁcial during the 1960s and 1970s. Another prominent Conservative – Douglas
Hurd, who served as Edward Heath’s political secretary and then as a cabinet minister under both Margaret
Thatcher and John Major – inherited the phrase and helped give it common currency. In a letter to one of the
authors, Lord Hurd writes of Fraser: ‘He was full of tales of past doings of the ‘‘great beasts’’, usually
culminating in a dramatic account of the Party conference of 1963 when they were all trumpeting in the
jungle.’ Although the use of the phrase in connection with politics may be relatively new, the concept itself
is old. More than a century ago, Sidney Low suggested that there were ‘superior and inferior classes of
ministers’, by which he meant ministers who counted and ministers who did not, by virtue of who they were as
well as the ofﬁces they held. See Sidney Low, The Governance of England (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1904),
pp. 162–70, esp. p. 167. Anthony King made use of both the phrase and the concept in ‘Ministerial Autonomy
in Britain’, in Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds, Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 203–25. King’s list of big beasts for the period 1945–94 is
substantially the same as, but not quite identical to, ours. According to King, the big beasts of the jungle in
Clement Attlee’s time were Ernest Bevin, Sir Stafford Cripps and Herbert Morrison. In a persuasive research
note, Laver and Shepsle also refer to ‘big beasts of the jungle’, but their reference is not to individuals but to
big political parties, ones that can mobilize sufﬁcient political talent to be able, on their own, to form a
government: ‘Ministrables and Government Formation: Munchkins, Players and Big Beasts of the Jungle’,
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12 (2000), 113–24.
49 The ﬁgure of 222 is calculated from the data set out in Butler and Butler, Twentieth-Century British
Political Facts 1900–2000, pp. 26–50, and Butler and Butler, British Political Facts since 1979, pp. 12–18.
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At this point, we need to clarify how we are using the term ‘big beast of the jungle’.
Nowadays, it is commonplace, especially among journalists, to use the phrase to denote
almost any politician who stands out from the crowd and carries a modicum of political
weight. Someone who has been around for a long time is especially apt to have that label
attached to him. An article published in The Economist in late 2008 identiﬁed no fewer
than nine big beasts, all of whom were said to be rumbling in the political jungle at that
time.50 We seek to use the term more sparingly and also more precisely, to enable us to
identify the biggest of the big beasts, those whom prime ministers have to take into
account and whom they anger or alienate at their peril.
On our deﬁnition, a big beast of the jungle is a cabinet minister or other politician who
has an unusually large amount of inﬂuence within his government or party but does not
owe that inﬂuence either to his formal position or to his personal relationship with the
prime minister of the day or his party leader. Big beasts may or may not be big physically,
but they tend to have big personalities; they are hard to overlook. Big beasts are almost
always highly intelligent and articulate, well above the general run of their con-
temporaries. They are also usually conﬁdent and assertive, sometimes to the point of
wilfulness. Some are unpredictable and owe their inﬂuence in part to their unpredict-
ability. It is not enough, however, for a potential big beast to have a range of impressive
personal qualities if he is also a loner. To be a big beast of the jungle, he must have a
substantial following in his party either in parliament or outside in the country. In
addition, he must stand for something: for a speciﬁc point of view, for a particular
approach to politics, or for one of his party’s great interests, such as the farming interest
on the Conservative side or the trade unions on Labour’s. Big beasts may be highly
contentious, but they can never be merely idiosyncratic: who they are and what they have
to say must resonate with others. Although a big beast’s standing within his own party is
crucial, it also helps if the individual in question is widely recognized and highly regarded
among the general public.
Big beasts of the jungle manifest their big ‘beastishness’ in various ways. If and when
they are cabinet ministers, they usually require and are accorded a large measure of
autonomy. They are allowed to get on with running their own department in their own
way, largely free from external inﬂuence, including prime ministerial inﬂuence; genuinely
autonomous departmental ministers are typically either big beasts or else people in charge
of politically marginal departments. Big beasts are also beasts who roam widely. They are
no respecters of other people’s turf and are prone to become involved in the business of
other people’s departments. Similarly, they typically feel free to speak out on a wide range
of issues, some of them having little or nothing to do with their own specialist brief. They
not only feel free to speak out: they are frequently listened to. What they say counts for
something. Most pertinent for the purposes of the present article is the fact that big beasts
are almost invariably in a position to cause trouble. When in ofﬁce, they can embarrass or
even bounce the prime minister, and a threat to resign on their part, or even the possibility
(F’note continued)
The total includes only those ministers who were full members of the cabinet, not those who, in Tony
Blair’s time, ‘attended’ cabinet without being full members of it; and, obviously, it does not include the
prime minister of the day, though it does include those prime ministers who, at an earlier or later stage
of their career, served under another prime minister between 1957 and 2007 (namely, Home, Heath,
Callaghan, Thatcher and Major).
50 Bagehot, ‘Rumble in the jungle’, The Economist, 11 December 2008.
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that they might resign, is something that a party leader or prime minister has to take into
account. Prime ministers do not have to worry at all about gerbils or even very much
about medium-sized beasts; but they do have to take care – or should take care – in
dealing with the larger and more ferocious beasts in their vicinity.
Table 3 lists, by party and in alphabetical order, the big beasts on our deﬁnition who
have roamed the political jungle over the past half century. The names of the very biggest
beasts are set out in plain roman type; those of the beasts who were somewhat lesser in
size, but were nevertheless quite big, are set out in italics. It is, of course, a matter of
judgement whether any named individual should be placed in one category or the other,
but few observers would probably want wholly to exclude the names of more than one or
two people listed in the table or to add the names of more than one or two who are not.
An indication of how we arrived at our codings is provided by Appendix 2, which takes
the form of a matrix covering those whom we have set out in plain roman type in Table 3,
those whom we have set out in italic type and those – the ‘candidate big beasts’, so to
speak – whom we considered listing in the table but decided not to. What the candidate
big beasts, those not listed in the table, have in common is that, although they possessed
some (or, in a few cases, most) of the personal qualities that distinguish the really big
beasts, their personal qualities did not lead them to have substantial followings either
in their party or in the country at large. They may have had admirers; most of them did.
But they did not have followings. Robin Cook, Peter Mandelson and Norman Tebbit, for
example, were all highly intelligent, conﬁdent and assertive, and all of them undoubtedly
stood for something; but they commanded very little, if anything, in the way of personal
loyalty.
TABLE 3 Big Beasts of the Jungle, 1957–2007
Conservative Labour
R.A. Butler Tony Benn
Kenneth Clarke George Brown
Edward Heath Gordon Brown
Michael Heseltine James Callaghan
Sir Geoffrey Howe Barbara Castle
Nigel Lawson Tony Crosland
Selwyn Lloyd Denis Healey
Iain Macleod Roy Jenkins




Note: The list of Conservative big beasts is longer than the list of Labour big
beasts principally because our main concern in this article is with big beasts
who served in cabinet under the prime minister of the day, and in the half-
century between 1957 and 2007 the Conservative party was in power for
considerably longer than the Labour party. At the risk of some incon-
sistency, we have included Enoch Powell in the list of Conservative big beasts
even though he was not really a big beast when he held cabinet ofﬁce and
only became one during and after his time as a member of Edward Heath’s
shadow cabinet. Like Michael Heseltine during the late 1980s, Powell was, so
to speak, a big beast in exile. See text for explanation of italics.
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We should add that, in the interests of completeness and even though this article
focuses almost entirely on big beasts during the time they held cabinet ofﬁce, we have
listed in Table 3 the name of one individual who did carry great political weight but only
after he had left ofﬁce: Enoch Powell. Four prime ministers, Sir Alec Douglas-Home,
Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair, are not listed because they were by no
means big beasts while they were rank-and-ﬁle cabinet ministers; Home was not a com-
manding ﬁgure in Macmillan’s cabinet, Thatcher counted for almost nothing in Heath’s,
Major counted for relatively little in Thatcher’s, and before becoming prime minister
Blair never served as a cabinet minister and was not a even a heavyweight ﬁgure in the
Labour party until a few months before being elected its leader. In contrast, Edward
Heath, James Callaghan and Gordon Brown as cabinet ministers were very big beasts of
the jungle long before they attained the highest ofﬁce. It goes without saying that not all
political beasts are of the same size throughout their whole political careers. Some gain in
stature; some diminish themselves or are diminished by others.51
CALCULATIONS AND MISCALCULATIONS
It follows from the above that one important test of any prime minister’s political skills is
how well, or how badly, he or she calculates the strength of his or her position vis-a`-vis
that of other ministers and, in particular, that of any big beast or big beasts who happen
to be about the place.
Harold Macmillan, as we noted earlier, had no difﬁculty in seeing off his chancellor in
1958: his own position was secure, and the departing chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft,
although he was by no means a negligible ﬁgure (he returned to the cabinet several years
later), never approached big-beast status. However, as we also noted earlier, Macmillan
seriously miscalculated in 1962 when, in the ‘night of the long knives’, he sacked a third of
his cabinet. Butchery on this scale would probably have smacked of panic and damaged
Macmillan under any circumstances; but the prime minister speciﬁcally failed to notice
that his then chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd, although never the biggest of beasts, had grown
substantially in political stature over the preceding years. Conservative MPs had come to
51 For example, among Conservatives, Reginald Maudling had clearly emerged as a big beast by the
time Harold Macmillan left ofﬁce in 1963. He remained one during Sir Alec Douglas-Home’s premiership
and ran a close second to Edward Heath in the 1965 Conservative leadership contest. However, although
he became home secretary under Heath, his ﬂaccid ministerial style and his mounting personal difﬁculties
undermined his position and he was in no sense a big beast during the ﬁnal phase of his career. On
the Labour side, Roy Jenkins was an enormous beast during the ﬁnal phase of Harold Wilson’s ﬁrst
premiership, especially following the devaluation of sterling in 1967, but his personal aloofness and
alienation from the majority of his party over Europe during the early 1970s had greatly weakened his
position by the time Labour returned to power in 1974. He was not a signiﬁcant force as home secretary
between 1974 and 1976, ﬁnishing a poor third in the 1976 Labour leadership election, and later in 1976
James Callaghan had no difﬁculty persuading him to quit the British political scene (to become president
of the European Commission). Barbara Castle, never a very big beast, had, like Jenkins, shrunk
considerably in stature by the time Labour returned to power in 1974. Callaghan in 1976 dispensed with
her services. In a later generation, Peter Mandelson lacked the stature to be a big beast during his two
stints as a cabinet minister under Tony Blair. But, when he returned to government under Gordon Brown
in 2008, he quickly established himself as a very big beast indeed. He still lacked any substantial following
in the Labour party and was not held in high regard by the general public, but he was certainly unusually
intelligent, assertive and unpredictable. In addition, whereas Blair’s political position had been strong
vis-a`-vis that of Mandelson, Brown’s was exceedingly weak.
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admire his loyalty and doggedness; and, in the eyes of many on the Tory back benches, he
had come personally to symbolize the desirability of ﬁscal discipline and restraint in
public spending. Macmillan’s own ofﬁcial biographer records that:
When the dejected Selwyn Lloyd ﬁrst appeared to take his seat on the backbenches following
the purge, he was cheered resoundingly by Tories, while Macmillan was greeted in chilly silence
and to Opposition jeersy [The] ghost of Selwyn Lloyd was to haunt Macmillan throughout
the rest of his administration.52
Macmillan had reasons for sacking Lloyd and might have sacked him in any event; but
it is clear that he grossly underestimated the political price he would have to pay – and
did pay – for dismissing him.53 His successor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was in too weak
a position to be able to consider dismissing anyone. Of the ﬁve big beasts of the
Conservative jungle during the early 1960s, two, Iain Macleod and Enoch Powell, were no
longer in the cabinet, having refused to serve under him, while the other three, R. A.
Butler, Edward Heath and Reginald Maudling, were free to roam at will – and did.54
When the Labour party under Harold Wilson returned to power in 1964, there was only
one big beast in the party’s jungle apart from Wilson himself: the party’s deputy leader,
George Brown. Brown, however, was an enormous beast – in both senses of the word. On
the one hand, he was enormously intelligent and energetic and popular in all sections of
the party; Wilson during the previous year had only narrowly defeated him for the party
leadership. On the other hand, he was wilful, tempestuous and frequently drunk, a man
whom any prime minister would have found all but impossible to handle. Wilson handled
him brilliantly, exploiting his abilities and popularity and ignoring his frequent threats of
resignation until the time came when he brought doom upon himself by dissipating both
his abilities and his popularity. Even when that time came – in 1968, during one of the ﬁrst
Wilson government’s frequent economic crises – Wilson did not go so far as to dismiss
Brown: he allowed him to dismiss himself. Without actually writing a letter of resignation,
52 Horne, Macmillan 1957–1986, p. 349.
53 One of Macmillan’s early biographers, Sir Nigel Fisher, who was himself a backbench Conservative
MP at the time, uses such words and phrases in describing the night of the long knives as ‘a grave political
error’, ‘whirlwind’, ‘bad advice’ (from the chief whip) and ‘a mistake – perhaps the ﬁrst serious mistake
Macmillan had made during his Premiership’. Although Fisher is generally sympathetic to Macmillan, his
account of the night of the long knives is extremely critical, not least in terms of the extent to which it
represented an error of political judgement on Macmillan’s part. See Nigel Fisher, Harold Macmillan
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), pp. 271–8.
54 The minister who roamed most freely at will, in the sense of acting almost entirely independently of
the prime minister and to some extent against the prime minister’s better judgement, was Edward Heath,
who as secretary of state for trade and industry insisted on promoting legislation to abolish the practice
known as resale price maintenance (RPM). The extant accounts of the episode all emphasize how
reluctant Home was to support Heath on RPM and the fact that the support Home did ﬁnally give him
was largely a product of his political dependence on him. Home’s biographer, D. R. Thorpe, notes that
‘For Home it was a question of backing Heath or moving him to another department’. Thorpe adds that
‘the second option was not politically viable’. Even so, Home’s response to Heath’s ﬁrst suggestion that
the government should abolish RPM was to minute, ‘This is very difﬁcult.’ See Thorpe, Alec Douglas-
Home, p. 356, and also Heath, The Course of My Life, esp. pp. 259–60, and Campbell, Edward Heath,
pp. 150–2. Campbell notes (p. 152) that ‘Home was not in a position easily to deny his right-hand man
and principal moderniser any measure he had set his heart on’. Home in his memoirs – The Way the Wind
Blows (London: Collins, 1976) – admits to having had ‘many misgivings’ (p. 189). See also Richard
Findley, ‘The Conservative Party and Defeat: the Signiﬁcance of Resale Price Maintenance for the
General Election of 1964’, Twentieth Century British History, 12 (2001), 327–53, p. 343.
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Brown told everyone within earshot during the midst of the crisis that he had resigned,
and Wilson took him at his word. Even a biographer sympathetic to Brown and hostile to
Wilson notes ruefully that when Brown went, ‘he did not quite do so ‘‘without a splash’’y
but the subsequent waves were nowhere near so mountainous as Wilson feared and Brown
hoped’.55 Indeed, Wilson had calculated aright: there were hardly any waves at all. Wilson
was equally shrewd in dealing with the two big beasts who had emerged by the end of his
ﬁrst premiership: James Callaghan and Roy Jenkins. He was weak. They were strong. He let
them alone.56
For the reasons given above, Edward Heath had no reason to concern himself with big
beasts: following Iain Macleod’s death, there were none in his cabinet, and he reigned
supreme. In contrast, Harold Wilson’s cabinet, during his brief second incarnation as
prime minister, included a veritable zoo full of big beasts, including nearly one-third of all
those listed in Table 3. All had served in cabinet between 1964 and 1970; all had great
abilities and substantial support within the party. With the possible exception of Barbara
Castle, a personal friend, Wilson could scarcely afford to lose the services of any of them.
The most difﬁcult to deal with was Tony Benn, who had been little more than a gerbil
during the previous decade but by the mid 1970s was a formidable politician. Wilson
again demonstrated his tactical brilliance. He appointed Benn to the important Depart-
ment of Industry (while hobbling him there) and then, following the defeat of Benn’s side
in the 1975 Common Market referendum, demoted him to the signiﬁcantly less important
Department of Energy.57 When Callaghan became prime minister, he left Benn where he
was and, like Wilson, hobbled him without dismissing him. At the height of his new-found
power in 1976, Callaghan encouraged Roy Jenkins, who might have re-established himself
as a serious rival, to depart for the European Commission in Brussels and, as we saw
55 Peter Paterson, The Life of Lord George Brown (London: Chatto & Windus, 1993), p. 241. Wilson in
his memoirs notes, with glee but probably accurately: ‘Even George Brown’s two closest supporters, of
many years’ standing, told him and other ministers that this time he had gone too far’ (Wilson, Labour
Government 1964–1970, p. 510).
56 In the case of Jenkins, Wilson refrained from acting against him even though he knew that Jenkins
and his allies were plotting against him and wanted to depose him in Jenkins’s favour. See the graphic
account of the Jenkins–Wilson relationship in Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pp. 488–91. In the even more
remarkable case of Callaghan, Wilson refrained from acting against him even though in 1969 Callaghan
semi-publicly – for all practical purposes, publicly – opposed the key element in the government’s
legislative programme: proposals for trade union reform based on the White Paper, In Place of Strife. In
his deﬁnitive account of the In Place of Strife episode – The Battle of Downing Street (London: Charles
Knight, 1970) – Peter Jenkins observes (p. 80) that ‘Callaghan was challenging the leadership [i.e. the
prime minister] on a clear issue, he was identifying himself with an alternative strategy; he was offering a
different style of leadership. For these reasons he had no intention of resigning y If Wilson wanted to
make an issue of it at this stage he would have to sack him. The Home Secretary [Callaghan] was fairly
conﬁdent that he would not be sacked.’ (See also pp. 94–5.) In the event, Callaghan did not resign, Wilson
did not sack him, and the In Place of Strife proposals were withdrawn.
57 See Ben Pimlott’s vivid account of Benn’s marginalization and then demotion – an account based on
a mass of evidence – in Harold Wilson, pp. 664–8. Benn was a big beast. Had he not been a big beast,
Wilson would undoubtedly have sacked him. Even so, Wilson, who was conﬁdent of his own position and
also conﬁdent in his judgement of both Benn’s position and his personality, treated Benn – as another
member of the cabinet, Tony Crosland, reported to his wife – as a cat would treat a mouse: Susan
Crosland, Tony Crosland (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), p. 293. Wilson acknowledged Benn’s big beast
status in his own account of Benn’s demotion: Harold Wilson, Final Term: The Labour Government
1974–1976 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), pp. 143–4. He feared Benn
might, after all, decide to return to the back benches, ‘the last place where I wished to see him’ (p. 144).
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earlier, summarily sacked Castle.58 Tony Crosland died in ofﬁce soon afterwards, with the
result that by the end of Callaghan’s premiership only Benn and Denis Healey, among the
original sextet of big beasts, remained in ofﬁce. No new one emerged.
In this connection, if in no other, the premiership of Margaret Thatcher turned out to
resemble Harold Macmillan’s: shrewdness bordering on brilliance followed by ineptness
amounting to folly. To begin with, especially during the period 1979–83, Thatcher used her
dismissal power to great effect, sacking or sidelining all but one of her ‘wet’ critics inside the
cabinet. Unsurprisingly, the one who remained was the only one who might be accounted a
big beast: Peter Walker. She feared the damage Walker could cause outside the cabinet and
declined to sack him, despite the fact that from time to time he was publicly critical of
government policy. Walker for his part was content to stay on board and to occupy relatively
minor cabinet posts. The prime minister and the big beast had a tacit – perhaps not so tacit –
treaty. He would not resign, and she would allow him to run his relatively minor departments
in his own way and to make speeches critical of government policy provided they were
expressed in suitably decorous language. As Walker put it apropos his joining the govern-
ment in 1979: ‘I had few illusions about the Prime Minister’s motives. I knew Margaret was
not going to give me a senior job. I was in the Cabinet because she thought I was safer in than
out. She knew that I knew that was the reason.’59 In the event, both honoured their side of the
bargain, and Walker remained in the Thatcher cabinet until almost the end.
Others, however, did not remain, and the circumstances of their departures hastened,
indeed probably brought about, her own departure. Thatcher simply, but grossly, mis-
calculated. She thought those who departed were little beasts when they were actually very
big ones. She thought her position was very strong when, as we observed earlier, it had in
reality become very weak, though she had failed to notice the fact. The trouble began in 1986
when she failed to go out of her way to conciliate one of her senior ministers, Michael
Heseltine, in order to discourage him, ﬁrst, from making trouble in public and then,
ultimately, from resigning. Once outside the cabinet, Heseltine felt free, not to attack either
the prime minister or the government, but to campaign among the Conservative party’s
membership in the country with a view to establishing a claim to the party’s leadership at
some time in the future. Free to roam, Heseltine was always a potential threat. In 1990, he
precipitated Thatcher’s departure by challenging her for the leadership.
In the meantime, she had failed to forestall the resignations of two other beasts whose
stature and ferocity she had also seriously underestimated. Her chancellor, Nigel Lawson,
fed up with being second-guessed by her private in-house economics adviser, Sir Alan
Walters, resigned suddenly and unexpectedly in 1989. Then, during the following year, her
former chancellor and foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, demoted by this time to the
(largely nominal) post of leader of the House of Commons, also resigned. He was fed up
58 Callaghan’s encouragement of Jenkins took the form of making it clear that he would not appoint
him to the one job in the new cabinet, that of the foreign secretary, that he really wanted and would have
accepted. As Callaghan’s biographer notes, ‘Roy Jenkins had been promised by Wilson before the leader-
ship contest the succession to the presidency of the European Commission, but he would have forgone
this if he could now move to the Foreign Ofﬁce in succession to the new Prime Minister. In fact,
Callaghan at once made it plain that it was to Brussels rather than to Carlton Gardens that he must go.
Jenkins, with his passion for Europe and his right-wing stance on most issues, he judged, would be a
divisive force in the party’ (Morgan, Callaghan, p. 477). Given Jenkins’s political stature and the wide-
spread support that he still had in the Labour party, it was convenient for Callaghan that the Brussels
bolt-hole was available.
59 Walker, Staying Power, p. 146.
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with being slighted by the premier and objected conscientiously and strenuously to her
increasing hostility to further European integration. His resignation speech in the House of
Commons seriously weakened Thatcher’s position and at the same time made it all but
impossible for Heseltine not to launch his challenge against her. By November 1990, when
she was driven from ofﬁce, there were only three big beasts left in the Conservative jungle –
Heseltine, Lawson and Howe – and she had contrived to alienate all three of them. Her
inadvertence, inattention and miscalculation cost her her job.60
Her successor, John Major, exercised far greater caution. He neither sacked nor precipit-
ated the resignation of any senior minister, even though he did regard some of them as
bastards, and he allowed Michael Heseltine, by now restored to ofﬁce, to roam freely. Tony
Blair was equally cautious. By the time he took ofﬁce as prime minister in 1997, Labour had
been out of ofﬁce for eighteen years, and during a large part of those eighteen years the party
had not looked like winning a general election. One consequence was that by 1997 there were
only two big beasts in the Labour jungle – John Prescott and Gordon Brown – and Blair
throughout his ten-year term of ofﬁce took care not to alienate or dismiss either of them. In
the case of Prescott, the task was easy: Prescott was intensely loyal and delighted to serve as
Blair’s deputy. In the case of Brown – one of the biggest beasts in recent history – the task was
far more difﬁcult: relations between the two men were often fraught, and Brown coveted –
and made no secret of the fact that he coveted – Blair’s job. Blair, however, studiously resisted
the temptation to sack Brown; and, fortunately for Blair, Brown proved reluctant to force the
issue or precipitate an open breach. Whether or not Blair as prime minister was conscious of
Macmillan’s and Thatcher’s miscalculations in dealing with big beasts, he certainly behaved
as though he were.61 Even so, Blair in the end resigned as early as June 2007 largely because
Brown was, at last, growling and baring his teeth.
A glance back at Table 1 is revealing in view of the way it relates to Table 3. In Table 3, the
names of twenty-one big beasts of the jungle, in our understanding of the term, are set out. It
is striking that, of the twenty-one, only ﬁve were either dismissed outright or constructively
dismissed by the prime minister or prime ministers under whom they served – this despite the
fact that most of the twenty-one were from time to time seriously at odds with their prime
ministerial boss. Of those ﬁve, Barbara Castle was dismissed and Roy Jenkins was allowed to
60 Alan Watkins in A Conservative Coup takes it for granted that ‘Michael Heseltine, Nigel Lawson and
Geoffrey Howe were the ministers (by this time, of course, ex-ministers) who were chieﬂy responsible for
bringing Mrs Thatcher to her current condition’ (p. 4). Her ‘current condition’, of course, was the one in
which she could be challenged and ousted. The enormity of Thatcher’s folly is emphasized by Watkins
and also by Robert Shepherd in The Power Brokers, chaps. 1–3. For the three big beasts’ own accounts of
their role in Thatcher’s removal from ofﬁce, see Heseltine, Life in the Jungle, chaps. 15–16; Nigel Lawson,
The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (London: Bantam Books, 1992), chaps. 76–7, 79, and
Geoffrey Howe, Conﬂict of Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994), chaps. 40–5. With regard to Howe,
Shepherd writes: ‘She dared not risk sacking Howe but treated him appallingly. At the last two cabinet
meetings before his resignation she had openly displayed her impatience with him when he spoke ‘‘rolling
her eyes and looking at the ceiling’’, according to one minister’ (p. 1).
61 On the strange Blair–Prescott–Brown triangle, see, among many, many other things, Rawnsley,
Servants of the People; Naughtie, The Rivals; and Alastair Campbell, The Blair Years: Extracts from the
Alastair Campbell Diaries (London: Hutchinson, 2007). Far from Blair being an overwhelmingly domin-
ant prime minister, he and Brown shared power. Prescott notes in his memoirs – Prezza: My Story:
Pulling No Punches (London: Headline Review, 2008), p. 303 – that Brown effectively blocked the prime
minister’s desire to take Britain into the European single currency and that he also ‘rarely took Tony fully
into his conﬁdence as he was preparing Budgets.’ Prescott also notes (p. 313) that Peter Mandelson,
another minister, often referred to the three men as ‘the Big Beasts’.
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go, but only when the prime minister of the day was at the height of his power and their own
power was waning. In the cases of all of the other three, Selwyn Lloyd, Nigel Lawson and Sir
Geoffrey Howe, the prime minister of the day paid a heavy political price for not treating
them with the consideration that is due big beasts. In politics, big beasts are also dangerous
beasts: Tyrannosaurus rex, not remotely Brachiosaurus.
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
The research conducted for this article and its substantive ﬁndings provoke two wider
reﬂections relating to the British prime ministership. Both can easily be stated.
In the ﬁrst place, our ﬁndings concerning the prevalence of big beasts in the immediate
environments of most British prime ministers inevitably align us with those who are sceptical
of claims that the British system is becoming signiﬁcantly more ‘presidential’. Of the eight
prime ministers between 1957 and 2007, only Edward Heath, as we have seen, did not have
to take into account the views – and the mere political presence – of one or more big beasts
in his cabinet. Margaret Thatcher was unique in a different way: there were big beasts in and
(later) around her cabinet, but latterly she chose to ignore the fact that they were indeed very
big and therefore potentially very dangerous. A future prime minister is unlikely to want to
repeat her mistakes. It is, of course, possible that occasional future prime ministers will, for
all or parts of their premierships, not have to accommodate big beasts, but the con-
catenations of circumstances that produce such situations seem likely to be rare. In short, we
are on the side of those students of Britain’s ‘core executive’ who maintain that British
government at the top comprises a set of relationships of mutual dependence and is far from
being monocratic in character. In the words of Martin J. Smith, ‘British government is not
prime ministerial government or cabinet government. Cabinets and prime ministers act
within the context of mutual dependence based on the exchange of resources with each other
and with other actors and institutions within the core executive.’62 We would only add the
obvious point that some cabinet ministers have signiﬁcantly more resources than others, by
virtue of who they are, not merely by virtue of the ofﬁces they hold.
Our second reﬂection is this. If, as we argue, the relationship between prime ministers and
big beasts is, most of the time, crucial to an understanding of British government at the top,
then it would seem worthwhile for political scientists, especially those with a historical bent,
to examine in detail the ways in which past prime ministers have dealt with their big beasts.
What are the signs that they have recognized them as such? To which posts in cabinet have
they assigned them? How, if at all, have they stroked their egos? How, if at all, have they
engaged them in decision making? On matters of policy, have prime ministers allowed them
to function as active initiators or, alternatively, as veto players? The unfortunate case of
Margaret Thatcher is well known and well documented, but less attention has been paid to
the relationships between, for example, Harold Macmillan and R. A. Butler or between
James Callaghan and Denis Healey. Every commentator acknowledges that the prime
minister–chancellor of the exchequer relationship is central to the workings of any British
government, but the same point could be made of the prime minister–big beast relationship
(especially, but not only, if a particular big beast happens also to be chancellor).
62 Martin J. Smith, ‘Interpreting the Rise and Fall of Margaret Thatcher: Power Dependence and the
Core Executive’, in R. A. W. Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive
(Basingstoke, Hants.: Macmillan, 1995), p. 123. See also Martin J. Smith, The Core Executive in Britain
(Basingstoke, Hants.: Macmillan, 1999), chap. 4.
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Big beasts in the British system apart, it is perhaps worth repeating the general point that
whether or not the head of government of any country does or does not possess – in practice
as well as in theory – the power to appoint and dismiss members of his or her administration
is crucial to an understanding of how that country’s government in its upper reaches actually
functions. That simple fact is almost universally recognized, and yet it is also striking that
most textbooks on individual countries, and even most books and articles on comparative
politics, devote little or no space to addressing it. We hope that the present article, whatever
else it does, may serve to heighten scholarly interest in this whole subject.
AP PEND IX 1
TABLE A1 Voluntary Resignations from Cabinets, 1957–2007
Harold Macmillan
Walter Monckton (1957) Alan Lennox-Boyd (1959)
Lord Salisbury (1957) Derick Heathcoat Amory (1960)
Peter Thorneycroft (1958)
Sir Alec Douglas-Home
Iain Macleod (1963)* Enoch Powell (1963)*
Harold Wilson (1964-70)
James Grifﬁths (1966) George Brown (1968)
Frank Cousins (1966) Ray Gunter (1968)
Lord Longford (1968)
Edward Heath




Lord Shepherd (1976) Edmund Dell (1978)
Reginald Prentice (1976)
Margaret Thatcher
Lord Carrington (1982) Nicholas Edwards (1987)
Humphrey Atkins (1982) Norman Tebbit (1987)
John Nott (1983) Lord Whitelaw (1988)
Lord Gowrie (1985) Lord Young (1989)
Michael Heseltine (1986) Norman Fowler (1990)
Leon Brittan (1986) Peter Walker (1990)
Sir Keith Joseph (1986)
John Major
John Redwood (1995) Douglas Hurd (1995)
Tony Blair
Donald Dewar (1999) Estelle Morris (2002)
Alun Michael (1999) Robin Cook (2003)
Frank Dobson (1999) Alan Milburn (2003)
George Robertson (1999) Helen Liddell (2003)
Baroness Jay (2001) Paul Boateng (2005)
Mo Mowlem (2001) Alan Milburn (2005)
* Iain Macleod and Enoch Powell did not resign in the strict sense, but they did resign in the sense
that, having been successful cabinet ministers under Harold Macmillan, they refused to stay on
under his successor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home.
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APPEND IX 2














Tony Benn No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
George Brown Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Gordon Brown Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R.A. Butler Yes ? No Yes Yes Yes
James Callaghan ? Yes Yes Yes Yes ?
Edward Heath Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Michael Heseltine Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Denis Healey Yes Yes No Yes Yes ?
Roy Jenkins Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Iain Macleod Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Reginald Maudling Yes No No Yes Yes No
John Prescott No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Lesser big beasts
Barbara Castle Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Kenneth Clarke Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ?
Tony Crosland Yes ? No Yes ? No
Sir Geoffrey Howe Yes ? No Yes No No
Nigel Lawson Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Selwyn Lloyd No ? No ? No No
Enoch Powell Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peter Walker Yes Yes No Yes ? No
Willie Whitelaw Yes No No ? No No
‘Candidate’ big beasts
David Blunkett No Yes No No No No
Robin Cook Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Richard Crossman Yes ? No No No No
Michael Foot ? No No Yes No No
Lord Hailsham Yes No Yes No No No
Douglas Hurd Yes No No ? No No
Sir Keith Joseph Yes No No Yes No No
Peter Mandelson Yes Yes No Yes No No
Jim Prior No No No Yes No No
Francis Pym No No No ? No No
Norman Tebbit Yes Yes ? Yes No No
Note: In this matrix, ‘Yes’ indicates that, in the authors’ judgement, the politician concerned
possessed the relevant attribute and ‘No’ that he or she did not. A question mark indicates
uncertainty in our minds. As indicated in the text, in a few cases it is a matter of judgement whether
an individual should be classiﬁed as a very big beast or as a lesser one. For example, a case could be
made out for regarding Kenneth Clarke as having been a very big beast during the last phase of the
Major government. Similarly, a case could be made out for reclassifying Peter Walker and, in
particular, Selwyn Lloyd as having been merely candidate big beasts rather than lesser ones.
However, adjustments such as these, even if all of them were made, would not affect the core
arguments set out in the text.
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